Goodbye Xanga

More on the NSA

After further research and discussion with Sharon, two more issues have been raised:

Collection Internet Traffic

Regarding the collection of Internet traffic, there does not seem to be many hard facts.  An article from Wired seems to do a fairly good job of describing what is known.  Namely, that based on the testimony of a former AT&T technician, Mark Klein, splitters have been installed by AT&T at critical backbone junctions to expose data going accross the network to the NSA.  However, what is not known, is exactly what data the NSA is looking at and what they do with it.  A Salon article, cites a statement by J. Scott Marcus, former senior advisor for Internet technology to the FCC.  According to Salon, "He suggests that massive amounts of data are collected at 15 to 20 locations around the country, where it is automatically screened...to...'data of interest' by a special system...before it is shipped off to...central collection points..."  Furthermore, Marcus suggests that only "off net" (traffic between AT&T and other providers) was shipped out and that domestic traffic (at least most of it) could be filtered out.

In other words, the fact that AT&T sends some of its core network traffic to the NSA does not mean that they are spying all domestic Internet traffic that you and I generate.  It is quite possible that the NSA still only receives or examines traffic with a foreign connection.

Collection of Call Records

Call records, the other issue Sharon brought up, originates primarly from this USA Today article.  The article begins by alleging that "The National Security Agency has been secretly collecting the phone call records of tens of millions of Americans, using data provided by AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth".  Essentially, the rest of the article alleges that the NSA has been given the call records (a record of data that includes no personal information or actual conversation recording, but only information such as the connected numbers, call duration, etc.) of most domestic calls since shortly after 911. However, several months later, USA Today issued note to readers.  Among other claims that the article backs off from, the note indicates that among the 3 accused telecoms, there is evidence that only AT&T released records and evidence that BellSouth and Verizon actually did not release records.  Also, lawmakers  briefed on the programs have apparently made many statements indicating that the programs scope is significantly less than USA Today originally claimed.  For example, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska (R) is cited by USA Today as claiming that "[The program] was long-distance. It was targeted on (geographic) areas of interest, places to which calls were believed to have come from al-Qaeda affiliates and from which calls were made to al-Qaeda affiliates."

Essentially, we find that once again the original claims significantly extend beyond what is known.  While it appears that it is true that a transfer of call records took place, fewer companies most likely transfered a much smaller pool of records than the virtually all call records originally claimed.

Additional Observations

In conclusion, while looking into this issue and having watch others in the past, I was struct by several observations.

First, while many have accused the Bush administration of trying to create an unjustifiably paranoid atmosphere to justify the expansion of government control, much of the reporting of the government control in question seems to be exaggerated itself, creating an unjustifiably paranoid atmosphere of a different kind.

Second, that many articles and people which decry government opacity (lack of transparency) in government does not seem to see any problem with having media opacity, reporting often exaggerated claims from "secret or anonymous" sources.

Comments

On Politics of Paranoia and Intimidation

A while ago, Cameron sent me a link to the b "log article "The Politics of Paranoia and Intimidation" by Floyd Rudmin and requested my thoughts on it.  Unfortunately, I had not been able to get around to it until now.

I'm afraid to say that Rudmin's articles is probably one of the lamest commentaries on the NSA controversy that I have read to date even from the very first sentence of the article which claims that "the NSA has been secretly monitoring the email and phone calls of all Americans".  This claims leads me to ask two questions:

1. Is Rudmin referring to the same NSA controversy as everyone else?
2. If so, what are is sources and why hasn't anyone else heard of them?

According to the Wikipedia article on the NSA electron surveillance program the NSA program in question only authorized warrentless surveillence of communications with at least one person outside of the US.  The only known exceptions to this case involved communications where both people were in the US but at least one of them had a cell phone with a foreign number.  For any surveillence of purely domestic communications, a warrent is and was still required.  Furthermore, according to the original NYT article that broke the story:

...the [NSA] monitored the international telephone calls and...e-mail messages of...perhaps thousands...of people inside the United States without warrants over the past three years...to track possible "dirty numbers" linked to Al Qaeda...

Therefore, Rudmin's claim that the NSA has been secretely monitoring all Americans (about 300 million) seems to be both absurd and without any basis. Rudmin's title indicates that he believes the Bush administration is perprating a paranoid atmosphere concerning Terrorism.  However, it seems the Rudmin himself is doing the same thing concerning the Bush administration by claiming they are spying on all Americans without warrents when they clearly are not.

Moving on from the introductory paragraph, Rudmin goes onto to make several arguments supposedly demonstrating the absurdity of such a policy.

1. Probabalistic Impossibility
2. Empirical Evidence Indicates NSA Failure
3. Ulterior Motive

Probabalistic Impossibility

First, Rudmin argues that the "mass surveillance of an entire population cannot find terrorists. It is a probabilistic impossibility."  To support this claim, he proceeds to apply some basic probability theory primarily based on Bayes' Theorem  At the end of his made up statistics, he concludes that the probability of a person identified by the system as a terrorist really is a terrorist is pretty close to zero and therefore useless.

However, he makes two critical errors in his analysis.

First, Rudmin's numerical analysis is based on flawed assumptions. He continues to assume that all 300 million Americans are being watched.  This makes his percentage of terrorists (he guesses 1000 in the US) to those watched (300 million) extremely low.   However, as discussed above, the number being surveilled is significiantly smaller than 300 million and the sample is NOT randomly distributed over the population.  Rather, a very small percentage of Americans & foreigners are suspected based on external information, front loading the search by eliminating most Americans.  As nearly all Rudmin's initial assumptions are incorrect, his manufactured statistics and therefore his conclusion are not justified by the actual facts.

Second, Rudmin ignores the potential benefits of catching a few terrorists.  Rudmin believes that a near zero identification of terrorists is essentially as good as zero.  Therefore, he weighs the cost (some innocent Americans receiving further investigation) versus no terrorists cost (essentially no benefits whatsoever) and concludes that the program is useless. However, we must remember that only 19 terrorists were able to murder nearly 3000 people (about 150 per terrorists) on American soil and that given other weapons (dirty bombs, biological weapons, etc.) a couple terrorists have the potential to kill at least thousands or tens of thousands each.  In that case, catching even a few terrorists potentially saves thousands of lives.  If we weigh that benefit (thousands saved) against the cost (some innocent Americans receiving extra surveillence), the conclusion that the program is utterly useless is much harder to draw.

Empirical Evidence Indicates NSA Failure

Rudmin's second major argument is that the empirical evidence indicates the program has failed.  Rudmin claims that the ratio of real terrorists to innocent people in prison camps and on the  no fly list demonstrates that the program has been ineffective in identifying terrorists and has led to restrictions on innocent people.  However, Rudmin fails to cite any figures, let alone sources, to support this claim.  For this reason, I can not seriously consider this claim.

Ulterior Motive

Rudmin ends his entry by implying that the Bush administration may have an ulterior motive in the NSA surveillance.  Rudmin argues that while the probability of identifying terrorists is obviously absurd (or not, see above), the probability of successfully identifying other groups (such as those who wish to impeach Bush) is much higher.  Rudmin provides no real evidence to back up this implication and again forgets that the NSA was not surveilling all American communications.  Due to this lack of any evidence and Rudmin's own repeated false assumption, his implication is entirely unjustified.  There is no reason to believe that the NSA program has an ulterior motive, even assuming that it is not very effective.

The Big Picture Is?

The DistantCollegian has replied to my previous post here Sorry this took me so long and may not be satisfactory. :-/

Clarification

It seems to me that we agree on a lot and our disagreement(s) have been relatively ambiguous so far.  Therefore, rather than answering the DistantCollegian directly, I would like to ask him if he believes the following a clear description of our disagreement:

Synopsis

I think we both agree that God is the source of moral truth, but we are discussion how God is the source of moral truth, with each of us presenting a slightly different view:

God's moral truth is the result of a conscious choice or thought process on His part.

God's moral truth is an inherent part of God's essential nature, that is, moral truth is not an idea God chooses, but something God is.

Furthermore, would you argue that, this being so, moral truth can be derived logically without special revelation?  If so, by what line of reasoning?

More on Reason an "Values"

The DistantCollegian has responded to my latest post on rational values here and here.  My response is as follows:

I think your recent post(s) cleared a lot of things up for me, thanks.   I think the majority of the rationalist/empiricists preceded or proceded most of the recent stuff I've been looking into (Kierkegaard and on + Plato), so it's a region of history and philosophy I'm regrettable relatively ignorant of.  That being so, you are correct that I missed British philosophy in my break down, as well as, missing the importance of Sartre's use of the term "a priori", which I minimized.   The moral of the story is that history is important for better understanding the present (err, more recent history).

Underground Man

Dostoevski is sometimes considered a proto-existentialist (and, being Russian, is if anything even crazier than the Western variety.)  Now, his insane book, Underground Man...(I have just saved my readers approximately 600 pages of Russian literature and incalculable headache.) - DistantCollegian

Thanks!  Even better than Clif Notes! :)

McDonald's Values

Brenden, however, treats Heather as a rationalist, because she believes that reason can support conservative values, not just experimental and scientific findings.  While I must grant that she did, in fact, say that, I cannot accept that she means it.  "Values," used in its modern sense, dates from the late nineteenth century, and means subjectively chosen beliefs, as distinct from Facts.  When you call beliefs values instead of principles, you are, by definition, saying that they lack rational support.  You yourself recognized Heather's understanding of "reason" as scientific and fact-based, and critiqued it as inadequate due to its lack of support for ultimate ends. - DistantCollegian

I am inclined to think you are correct in your interpretation (even though it leads here statement to become an oxymoron).  Few, if any, people have ever been 100% consistent in their world views.  However, it seems to me that even many well known Empiricists, such as Locke, based their political arguments, which influenced our Declaration of Independence, upon an appeal to rights "endowed by our Creator".  In other words, even the Empiricists seemed to accept at some level that a divine mandate was necessary to establish any moral system, including the justification for the mere basis of government and governing mandates.  This necessity of God is my primary point, and many who claim, like McDonald, that Conservative "values/policies" can or should be supported with reason are really trying to place the burden of proving a moral system without God upon those of us who hold such values and support such policies.  Therefore, my primary point here is that, and it seems we agree on this, that not only is this an unfair burden, as it implies that God is a useless concept unnecessary for everyday life, but this is also an impossible burden.

Which Came First, the Divine Mind or A Priori Law?

I'm afraid I still do not fully understand your argument on this point.  First, I understood your argument as follows:

A prior means an idea or concept that exists absolutely before it is 'discovered' or thought.

If a priori good is the product of an infinite and perfect mind, the mind/thought precedes the idea (which contradicts the definition of a priori).

Apparently, this was incorrect.  Are you now saying that you are arguing as follows?

A priori good is an moral standard.
If a perfectly good mind is required to produce a priori good, there is no standard prior to the production of the good by which to determine the perfection of the perfectly good mind.

Is my second understanding correct?  If so, I remain unconvinced.

First, I am not entirely sure that Sartre is using perfect with a connection to goodness.   It seems to me that what he is probably using the word to mean is "without error", in much the same way I might describe the ideal computer.   Thus, this mind that Sartre refers to is not morally perfect, but rationally perfect, in which the pre-existence of a moral standard by which to judge its perfection is irrelevant.

Second, I am not entirely sure that the temporal conundrum you suggest is really a problem.   If a mind produces this a prior standard of good, and then, upon examination of that mind, we discover it to be perfect with regard to that previously determined standard of good, I see no problem with declarations afterwards that the mind is perfect.  In other words, while "there is no a priori basis for doing so" in times preceding that, once the standard exists, there is an a priori basis for doing so afterwards, a period of time in which we are now living.

Third, fastforwarding to your closing paragraph on this topic, I think you might be right here:

God does not only think Truth, he is Truth...in fact God's consciousness and Truth are both eternal - DistantCollegian

However, I would add that God really is not a temporal creature as we are.  Thus, he not only is Truth, He knows all truth and comprehends all truth at all times.  He may even also think all thoughts at all times.  Thus, the error in our previous discussion may be inherently in error in that it discusses temporal issues where there are none.   God simultaneously thinks truth and is truth, and there has never been a "time" when He did one without the other.  However, I'm not sure I accept or understand your argument on logical precedence, or that "the Father logically precedes the Son".  What does it mean for a person to precede another?  Are you simply speaking in terms of authority?  If so, how does this apply to God being/thinking the good?

Necessity of Divine Good by Elimination

Under this point, I argued that there are three logically possible sources for a moral standard:

1 - The impersonal universe
2 - An impersonal being
3 - A personal being (God)

While the DistantCollegian appears to agree with me in rejecting the first possibility, he is not so ready to reject the 2nd.   I will admit the case for the first one seems much easier, but I am still convinced that the 2nd should be rejected as well.

As the DistantCollegian pointed out, I claimed that the 2nd case was really quite similar to the first, and a moral system demands an absolute imperative to follow it, which does not seem capable of proceding from an impersonal force.  Rather, he argues whether a system cares whether one follows it or not, that does not makes its dictums any less true.  As an example, he uses the system of mathematics.  To the contrary, it seems to me that this is an excellent example of what I meant.  For example, according to Mathematical Law, 2+2=4.   However, as I pointed out, Mathematics does not care whether you wish to follow this law or not.  For example, according to Mathematically Law, 2+2=4.  But what imperative is there to dictate that I should not act as if 2+2=5?  Sure, it would be stupid, just as braking what many of us would consider to be moral law would be stupid, but I do not see how such principles can be extended to imperatives which justify any civil laws, such as restitution, imprisonment, or execution.

The Distant Collegian also takes issue with my argument for the addendum that this personal being be "morally authoritative":

Well, yes.  But this begs the question where this personal being gets his moral authority.  It cannot come from his simply thinking it, for then it would have no more validity than your hapless superior man, philosopher king, or human god.

I apologize for leaving the argument incomplete.   The difference between the being in question (God) and any random man is that God, as the creator of not only all men but of all that men see, is logically justified as being their superior and dispensing "inalienable rights" and imperative morals unlike those who are equals (men).

Kierkegaard

Incidentally, if it is indeed true that God (arbitrarily?) thought his moral laws into existence, then it would actually seem that Kierkegaard is right in his famous essay of the Sacrifice of Isaac story.  Human beings might, through reason, discover a priori moral law; but pure faith in God is a still higher realm, so rejecting a priori moral law in favor of the leap of faith is the greatest demonstration of faith.  Thus, Abraham was so devoted to God that he transcended his ethical ideals in order to obey him, and was therefore the great hero of the faith.  So if God's will is prior to the a priori, it would seem that Kierkegaard was essentially right.  Rationalism ought after all to be rejected in favor of the Leap of Faith, as Kierkegaard understood it. - DistantCollegian

My understanding of Kierkegaard's argument there was not regarding moral law, but rather that Abraham had faith (irrationally) that God would work everything out and that via this irrational leap of faith in God, Abraham was able to move beyond the realm of reason to something more meaningful, real, and affirming.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I think most of the above is picking over details.   The Collegian and I pretty much agree in essentials, but the devil is in the details.